We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we...

Bidding challenges learning theories since experiences with the same bid vary stochastically:the same choice can result in either a gain or a loss. In such an environment thequestion arises how the nearly universally documented phenomenon of loss aversion affectsthe adaptive dynamics. We analyze...

We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey (1987). In a 2x2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey (1987). Our results provide clear evidence for Hey’s (1987) conjecture that...

We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey (J Econ Behav Organ 8:137–144, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">1987</CitationRef>). In a 2 <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\times $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mo>×</mo> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> 2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey (<CitationRef CitationID="CR16">1987</CitationRef>). Our results...</citationref></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></citationref>

We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all...

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of...

The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in public goods experiments to increase considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an experiment to study the conjecture that an environment...

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from...