This paper experimentally investigates the interdependence between market competition and endogenously emerging inter-firm collaboration. We restrict attention to arrangements resulting from bilateral collaboration agreements that typically characterize real world applications in which the...

We investigate the ability of the damage based tax mechanism to induce socially optimal outcomes in a controlled laboratory environment which incorporates important aspects of nonpoint pollution problems. Our experimental setting combines a strictly convex damage function with uncertainty in...

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of ourexperimental...

We consider a modi¯ed pure public good game characterized by a pre-play negotiation stage, onwhich pairs of players can form binding cooperation commitments. As the introduced mecha-nism only supports pairwise rather than more inclusive commitments, it does not implement thee±cient outcome. We...

We study sequential parimutuel betting markets with asymmetrically informed bettors, usingan experimental approach. In one treatment, groups of eight participants play twenty repetitionsof a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observedby other...

A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

This paper aims to experimentally investigate how individual willingness to pay for a lottery is affected by using a new way of representing of probabilistic ambiguity. Thus we can see how individual valuation reacts to different degrees of ambiguity probability information provided to subjects....

Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a...

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limitsimposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Suchcontribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The first is that they prevent corruption,the...

A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer)who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider.The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private costassumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjectstreatment) to capture...