Erat and Gneezy (2012) conduct an experiment to test whether people avoid lying in a situation where doing so would lead to a Pareto improvement. They conclude that many people exhibit such a "pure lie aversion." I argue that the experiment does not provide a reliable test for such an aversion,...

We investigate the effects of voting rules on delay in a multilateral bargaining experiment with costly communication. Our design is based on a variant of the Baron-Ferejohn framework. Communication takes place after a proposer is selected and before a proposal is made. In contrast to prior...

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limitsimposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Suchcontribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The first is that they prevent corruption,the...

Erat and Gneezy (2012) conduct an experiment to test whether people avoid lying in a situation where doing so would lead to a Pareto improvement. They conclude that many people exhibit such a "pure lie aversion." I argue that the experiment does not provide a reliable test for such an aversion,...

Erat and Gneezy (2012) conduct an experiment to test whether people avoid lying in a situation where doing so would lead to a Pareto improvement. They conclude that many people exhibit such a "pure lie aversion." I argue that the experiment does not provide a reliable test for such an aversion,...

We experimentally investigate the effects of group size on behavior and outcomes in a multilateral bargaining game. Using a Baron–Ferejohn protocol, our main interest is in the extent of costly delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement). We investigate the effects of group...