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Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may,first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose workeffort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for bothtasks as offered by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005863219
Sick-pay is a common provision in labor contracts. It insures workersagainst a sudden loss of income due to unexpected absences andhelps them smooth consumption. Therefore, many governments findsick-pay socially desirable and choose to mandate its provision. Butsick-pay is not without its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248999
Chapter written for the Handbook of Reciprocity, Gift-Giving and Altruism
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334040
We study experimentally partnership protocols of the sort proposed by Kalai and Kalai (2010), for bilateral trade games with incomplete information. We utilize the familiar game analyzed by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and Myerson and Sattherwaite (1983), with a buyer and seller with value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334257
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427343
This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427405
This paper surveys recent experimental and field evidence on the impact of concerns for fairness, reciprocity and altruism on economic decision making. It also reviews some new theoretical attempts to model the observed behavior.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427418
We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups purchase inputs more economically. In a repeated game, abandoning the buyer group altogether or excluding single firms constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190130
We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers of firms, we compare pricing behavior with and without the possibility to communicate among firms. We find strong...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048634
We examine experimentally how link costs affect the formation of links between a single seller and two potential buyers as well as the ensuing bargaining. Theory predicts that link costs lead to less competitive networks, with one link rather than two links, and that link costs do not affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049882