We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture....

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric...

This paper combines an economic experiment with survey data to investigate determinants of trust and trustworthiness in the Dutch society. We contrast the inferences which can be made on the trust propensity using stated and revealed measures and we test for participation bias in our experiment....

Choice between different versions of a game may provide a means of sorting, allowing players with different preferences to self-select into groups of similar types. We experimentally investigate whether auctioning off the right to play a prisoner's dilemma game in which the cost of unilateral...

A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

Direct transfers allow heirs to freely use what has been passed on to them. Bequeathers who do not trust their descendants to make proper use of the fortune may prefer investing it in a safe foundation, thereby limiting their descendants’ autonomy. In our study we compare experimentally these...

A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer)who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider.The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private costassumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjectstreatment) to capture...

Hegemony is a central feature of contemporary international politicsbut it remains seriously under-theorized. We draw on cooperative game theoryto represent and analyze different aspects of hegemony. After developing ageneral conception of hegemony, we analyze the circumstances under which...

We report on an experiment designed to explore the interrelation of otherregardingconcerns with attitudes towards risk and delay when the latterhave a social dimension, i.e., pertain to one's own and another person'spayos. For this sake, we compare evaluations of several prospects, eachof which...

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set theirquantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market,only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We …nd that preemption tends to beasymmetric in the sense...