We report the results of an experiment that examines play in a 50 periods repetition of a two-player coordination game (Stag Hunt game), which admits two pure strategy Nash equilibria that are Pareto-ranked : a payoff-dominant equilibrium and a risk-dominant equilibrium. We consider a 2x3...

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of our experimental...

Our objective in this paper is to assess the acceptability of the ambient tax. Concretely, we ask subjects to choose between (A) an ambient tax and (B) an individual tax system. In case (A), they actually participate in a game in which their payoff depends on all participants' decisions and on...

We investigate the ability of the damage based tax mechanism to induce socially optimal outcomes in a controlled laboratory environment which incorporates important aspects of nonpoint pollution problems. Our experimental setting combines a strictly convex damage function with uncertainty in...

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of ourexperimental...

Our objective in this paper is to assess the acceptability of the ambient tax. Concretely, we ask subjects to choose between (A) an ambient tax and (B) an individual tax system. In case (A), they actually participate in a game in which their payo depends on all participants' decisions and on...

This paper experimentally investigates the interdependence between market competition and endogenously emerging inter-firm collaboration. We restrict attention to arrangements resulting from bilateral collaboration agreements that typically characterize real world applications in which the...

The employment relationship is characterized by incomplete contracts. Labor contracts often take the form of a fixed wage without explicit performance incentives meaning that workers have a large degree of discretion over effort levels. As a consequence, an employee’s general jobattitude...

We consider a modi¯ed pure public good game characterized by a pre-play negotiation stage, onwhich pairs of players can form binding cooperation commitments. As the introduced mecha-nism only supports pairwise rather than more inclusive commitments, it does not implement thee±cient outcome. We...