An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent's ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information.The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire's type differs from the true underlying...

An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent's ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire's type differs from the true underlying...

This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete-information, all-pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize. They observe the efforts made by their earlier...

An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent’s ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire’s type differs from the true underlying...

We argue that inter-jurisdictional competition in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime distorts local politicians' incentives in resource allocation among firms from their own city and a competing city. We develop a tournament model of project selection that captures the driving...

This paper investigates the optimal formation of teams in a tournament. A manager sorts four workers---who differ in their productivity---into two teams. Workers on each team join forces to produce team output, and one team wins a prize; e.g., a bonus package. Two sorting patterns are possible:...

An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent’s ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire’s type differs from the true underlying...