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Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities

Brocas, Isabelle - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 54 (2003) 2, pp. 125-149

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001816026

Selling an asset to a competitor

Brocas, Isabelle - In: European economic review : EER 57 (2013) 1, pp. 39-62

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009706227

Optical allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities

Brocas, Isabelle - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 75 (2013) 3, pp. 359-387

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010128389

Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities

Brocas, Isabelle - In: Journal of mathematical economics 50 (2014), pp. 22-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476884

Optimal choice of characteristics for a non-excludable good

Brocas, Isabelle - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003353543

Designing auctions in R&D : optimal licensing of an innovation

Brocas, Isabelle (contributor) - In: Topics in economic analysis & policy 6 (2006) 1, pp. 1-39

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003369451

Optimal choice of characteristics for a nonexcludable good

Brocas, Isabelle - In: The Rand journal of economics 39 (2008) 1, pp. 283-304

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003713171

Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities

Brocas, Isabelle - In: Theory and Decision 54 (2003) 2, pp. 125-149

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005709859

Selling an asset to a competitor

Brocas, Isabelle - In: European Economic Review 57 (2013) C, pp. 39-62

A seller decides whether to allocate an item among two potential buyers. The seller and buyer 1 interact ex post in such a way that each of them suffers a negative externality if the other possesses the item. We show that the optimal allocation rule favors buyer 2, who does not interact ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608230

Auctions With Type-Dependent and Negative Externalities : The Optimal Mechanism

Brocas, Isabelle - 2007

We analyze optimal auction design in the presence of negative externalities. We assume that externalities are a function of both the valuation of the agent who suffers it and the valuation of the agent who obtains the good. This introduces two different sources of countervailing incentives: the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728588