We study the group stability of collective decision making when society is organized according to a non directed graph, and groups' payoff possibilities are given by a partition function. We focus on the stability properties of hierarchical organizations, formally described by minimally...

We study the stability properties of organizations in partition function games, describing cooperative situations with externalities. An organization is defined as a group of agents, together with a set of bilateral relations, formally, a connected graph. Because of the presence of...

We study the group stability of collective decision making when society is organized according to a non directed graph, and groups’ payoff possibilities are given by a partition function. We focus on the stability properties of hierarchical organizations, formally described by minimally...

We study the group stability of collective decision making when society is organized according to a non directed graph, and groups' payoff possibilities are given by a partition function. We focus on the stability properties of hierarchical organizations, formally described by minimally...

We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an externalities on non contractors. The principal can either contract both agents in a centralized manner, or delegate one agent to contract the other. We show that the choice of the principal depends on the...

We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities,...

In this note we study the centralization vs. decentralization issue for the management of a given collective activity. The aim is to characterize a class of decision rules that guarantees the stability of global cooperation (i.e centralization) against the incentive of coalitions of citizens to...