In classical school choice contexts there exists a centralized assignment procedure that is stable and strategy-proof: the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism. We show that this property is not satisfied when externalities are incorporated into the model, even in scenarios in which...

In matching problems with externalities, prudence measures the importance given to potential reactions when evaluating a deviation; social connectedness, on the other hand, measures the capacity to react to such deviations. Intuitively, a matching problem should be more likely to have a stable...

We study coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities, including marriage markets, roommate problems, and Shapley-Scarf housing markets as particular cases. When preferences are randomly determined, the probability of having a coalitionally stable solution is positively affected...

We consider a general equilibrium model of a private ownership economy with consumption and production externalities. Utility functions and production technologies may be affected by the consumption and production activities of all other agents in the economy. We use differential techniques to...

We consider a general model of pure exchange economies with consumption externalities. Households may have different consumption sets and each consumption set is described by a function called possibility function. Utility and possibility functions depend on the consumptions of all households....

With the development of modern information technologies, relying on nanotechnologies and remote sensing, a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the negative externalities generated by producers, consumers or travelers - road pricing schemes or individual emission...