In an interconnected world, economic and political interests inevitably reach beyond national borders. Since policy choices generate external economic and political costs, foreign state and non-state actors have an interest in inflencing policy actions in other sovereign countries to their...

We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...

We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...

This paper shows how competition between interests can internalize economic externalities groups. The key feature is that some lobby groups give political voice to environmental demands. We illustrate the basic ideas in a common agency model of politics, into which we introduce a negative output...

This paper shows how competition between interests can internalize economic externalities groups. The key feature is that some lobby groups give political voice to environmental demands. We illustrate the basic ideas in a common agency model of politics, into which we introduce a negative output...