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Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy
Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - 2010
We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334017
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Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy
Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - 2010
We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. Within this setup, we ask whether policymakers should interfere when better informed agents make individual investment decisions. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352078
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Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy
Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - 2010
We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935694
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Rational exuberance
Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - In: European economic review : EER 56 (2012) 6, pp. 1220-1240
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009696347
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Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
Björnerstedt, Jonas; Westermark, Andreas - 2008 - rev.
stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010128002
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Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy
Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - 2010
We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. Within this setup, we ask whether policymakers should interfere when better informed agents make individual investment decisions. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008699644
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Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities
Kawamori, Tomohiko; Miyakawa, Toshiji - In: Economics letters 183 (2019), pp. 1-5
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012122548
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Collective hold-up
Iaryczower, Matiás; Oliveros, Santiago - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1063-1100
agents increases inefficient delay and reduces agents' welfare. This occurs in spite of the lack of informational asymmetries …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014325262