We find a negative relation between hedge fund manager’s personal income tax rates and fund performance. Using changes in tax deferral regulation or state-level tax rates suggest causality in the tax-performance relation. Managers are less likely to hold stocks with greater information...

Exploiting an exogenous disclosure rule change and the unique dual-class share system in China, this study tests whether improved information disclosure leads to higher executive compensation. Consistent with the theoretical prediction in Hermalin and Weisbach (2012), we find that after China...

We study the supply side of the market for CEOs as outside board members in the context of increasing legal and shareholder pressure on CEOs to refrain from accepting outside directorships. Consistent with potential benefits to their employing firms, CEOs have been increasingly more likely to...

We analyze risk shifting by poorly performing hedge funds - and test predictions on the extent to which risk choices are related to the fund's incentive contract, investment horizon and dissemination of performance information. Consistent with theoretical arguments we find that the propensity...

We examine the role of high-water mark provisions in hedge fund compensation contracts. In our model of competitive markets and asymmetric information on manager ability, a fee contract with a high-water mark can improve the quality of the manager pool entering the market. In addition, a...