Similar Search Results

Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation

Gayle, George-Levi - 2019

This paper investigates the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on CEO compensation, using panel data constructed for the S&P 1500 firms on CEO compensation, financial returns, and reported accounting income. Empirically SOX (i) changes the relationship between a firm's abnormal returns and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904043

Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation

Gayle, George-Levi; Li, Chen; Miller, Robert - 2021

This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a dynamic principal-agent model of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240930

Was Sarbanes–Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation

Gayle, George-Levi; Li, Chen; Miller, Robert - 2022

This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a principal–agent model with hidden...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014244206

All hat and no cattle? : ESG incentives in executive compensation

Efing, Matthias; Ehmann, Stefanie; Kampkötter, Patrick; … - 2024

This paper examines the integration of ESG performance metrics into executive compensation using a detailed panel dataset of European executives. Despite becoming more widespread, most ESG metrics are largely discretionary, carry immaterial weights in payout calculations, and contribute little...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015077841

Entrenchment or Incentive? CEO Employment Contracts and Acquisition Decisions

Zhao, Jing - 2013

. Using a unique dataset on S&P 500 CEO employment contracts during 1993-2005, I find that acquirers with a CEO contract … performance, and undertake riskier deals than acquirers without a contract. Further investigation of individual contract … provisions reveals substantial heterogeneity. Specifically, the fixed term rather than at will contract, longer contract duration …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083291

Decisions of duopoly firms on sharing information on their delegation contracts

Baik, Kyung Hwan; Lee, Dongryul - In: Review of industrial organization 57 (2020) 1, pp. 145-165

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012303502

The Value of Interlocking Directorates in Vertical Contracting

Battaggion, Maria Rosa; Cerasi, Vittoria; Karakoç, Gülen - 2021

This study analyzes the choice to interlock between two competing companies when their privately known marginal costs are correlated. The two rivals are organized into different business models: one delegates its production to a subcontractor, while the other is vertically integrated and carries...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213918

Performance Contingencies in CEO Equity Awards and Debt Contracting

Bizjak, John M. - 2018

We find that firms that grant performance-contingent (p-c) equity awards with accounting-based vesting conditions to their CEOs have lower cost of debt and less restrictive loan terms. The benefits of p-c accounting awards on debt financing are greater when the moral hazard problem faced by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012934578

Trading away incentives

Colonnello, Stefano; Curatola, Giuliano Antonio; Xia, Shuo - 2022 - This draft: October 19, 2022

Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411812

Complexity of CEO Compensation Packages

Albuquerque, Ana M.; Carter, Mary Ellen; Guo, Zhe (Michael) - 2023

are, what drives that complexity, and its implications. We develop a new measure of compensation contract complexity and … find that complexity relates to factors capturing firm complexity as well as the inclusion of contract provisions to … are associated with greater contract complexity. We find that complexity has deleterious consequences; compensation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014257605

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last