Extensive discussions of the inefficiencies of "short-termism" in executive compensation notwithstanding, very little is known empirically about the extent of such short-termism. This paper develops a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay...

While much is made of the ills of “short-termism” in executive compensation, in reality very little is known empirically about the extent of short-termism in CEO compensation. This paper develops a new measure of CEO pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different components of...

We document substantial variation across startups in whether and when they appoint outside directors, and the type of directors they appoint. The startup-director match depends on professional connections and individual experience profiles. Early-stage investors are more likely to serve as...

We examine the role of deferred vesting of stock and option grants in reducing executive turnover. To the extent an executive forfeits all unvested stock and option grants if she leaves the firm, deferred vesting will increase the cost (to the executive) of early exit. Using pay Duration...

How do changes to stock price informativeness affect the mix of long-term and short-term pay? We answer this question using two exogenous shocks to price informativeness: the reduction in analyst coverage due to closure of brokerage houses and mutual-fund flow driven price pressure. Using the...

We examine the extent to which deferred vesting of stock and option grants (deferred pay) helps firms retain executives. To the extent an executive forfeits all deferred pay if they leave the firm, deferred vesting will increase the cost (to the executive) of an early exit. The impact of...