In a competitive managerial labor market, compensation contracts should not depend on public attitudes or social norms regarding income inequality or "fair pay". In contrast to the standard view of optimal incentive design, we find that public opinion impacts executive compensation. We show that...

Fund companies regularly send shareholder letters to their investors. We use textual analysis to investigate whether these letters matter for fund flows and whether they predict performance and investment styles. We find that fund investors react to the writing style of shareholder letters; a...

We show that CEOs of prestigious firms earn less. Total compensation is on average 8% lower for firms listed in Fortune's ranking of America's most admired companies. We suggest that CEOs are willing to trade off status and career benefits from working for a publicly admired company against...

Fund companies regularly send shareholder letters to their investors. We use textual analysis to investigate whether these letters' writing style influences fund flows and whether it predicts performance and investment styles. Fund investors react to the tone and content of shareholder letters:...