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We investigate the differentiated duopoly and triopoly markets in which firms can choose to strategically delegate when … under duopoly, one firm chooses delegate, while the other firm chooses not to delegate as multiple equilibria. However, in … equilibrium, our results imply that the underconfident (overconfident) manager in the duopoly (triopoly) is more likely to take …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241508
We revisit the two-stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and asymmetric technologies of Sen and Stamatopoulos …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011714314
This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in duopoly market structure, if the managers' salary varies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014030178
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003611781
We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734216
If managers bargain with workers over wage before choosing output in a Cournot duopoly, owners face two conflicting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063251
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013549122
The paper investigates both quantity and price oligopoly games in markets with a variable number of managerial and entrepreneurial firms which defines market structure. Following Vickers (Economic Journal, 1985) which establishes an equivalence between the equilibrium under unilateral delegation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524757
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012590220
We analyze a Cournot duopoly market with differentiated goods and the separation between ownership and control. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012595219