This study presents a review of theoretical concepts described in the literature that explain how corporate events might be perceived by investors. The theoretical discussion in this paper is related to three corporate events: CEO turnovers, dividend payouts, and block trades. The objective of...

We study the consequences of CEO turnover announcements on the stock prices of firms in China, where most listed firms remain majority-owned by the state. Our proposition is that state ownership may affect stock market reaction to CEO replacement because state-owned firms often pursue multiple,...

Our study analyzes a large sample of transactions carried out by corporate insiders reported to the German regulatory authority BaFin in the period July 1, 2002 to April 30, 2005 employing event study methodology. In particular, we focus on the question whether corporate insiders exploit inside...

Until October 2004 corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the shares of their firm 'without delay'. In practice substantial reporting delays were common. We show that the delays are systematically related to the characteristics of the firm. Delays are longer in...

To gain insights about the quality of board's firing decisions, we investigate abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand- collected sample of 208 “clean” turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous...

CEO compensation is a highly controversial subject. While most company directors believe that CEO pay is not a problem, the majority of the American public believes that it is. The difficulties that boards face in justifying CEO pay levels in some ways stem from the challenge of quantifying how...

Using a sample of target firms that do not delist from the stock market after a majority takeover, we investigate the effect of the target CEO's departure on their firms' subsequent financial performance. We find that CEO departures have a positive effect on the target firms' long-run operating...

I show that nonroutine premerger trades by acquirer outside directors contain a significant amount of private information and indicate opportunistic trading on the information. I find that outside directors sell shares before less valuable deals and purchase shares before more value enhancing...

The value a director provides to a firm is empirically hard to establish. We estimate that value by exploiting the commonality in idiosyncratic returns of firms linked by a director and show that, on average, a single director's influence causes variation in firm value of almost 1% per year. The...