Die Autoren untersuchen anhand unterschiedlicher Modelle die steuerlichen Maßnahmen, um den Bedürfnissen kinderreicher Familien gerecht zu werden. Unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen könnte sich die Steuerbelastung an der Familiengröße orientieren und kindbedingte Erfordernisse...

The relationship between government and parents is modelled as a principal-agent problem, with the former in the role of principal and the latter in the role of agents. We make three major points. The first is that, if the well-being of the child depends not only on luck, but also on parental...

The relationship between government and parents is modelled as a principal-agent problem, with the former in the role of principal and the latter in the role of agents. We make three major points. The first is that, if the well-being of the child depends not only on luck, but also on parental...

The effects and optimal choice of policy instruments affecting the family (child benefits, taxes on child-specific commodities, etc.) are examined within the context of a household economics model with fertility choice. The simultaneous consideration of child benefits and commodity taxes in the...