Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003469550
We examine the role of macroeconomic announcements in shaping the earnings forecasts of equity market analysts. We find that earnings forecasts strongly respond to macroeconomic releases signaling changes in overall business conditions after controlling for analysts' learning from firm- and...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013109000
Using a novel dataset that tracks daily changes in hedge fund fee structure, we examine the determinants and consequences of changes in the three components of the fee structure, namely the management fee, incentive fee, and the high-water mark provision. We find that funds respond symmetrically...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013109004
We provide a rationale for window dressing where investors respond to conflicting signals of managerial ability inferred from a fund's performance and disclosed portfolio holdings. We contend that window dressers take a risky bet on their performance during a reporting delay period, which...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013068301
This paper introduces two measures to investigate potential window-dressing behavior among mutual fund managers. We show that unskilled managers that perform poorly are more likely to window dress by strategically purchasing winner stocks and selling loser stocks near quarter ends. Further,...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008992003
We examine the determinants and consequences of changes in hedge fund fee structures. We show that fee changes are asymmetric with much greater incidence of fee increases compared to fee decreases. We find that managers of younger and smaller funds are more likely to increase fees after good...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009006784
We provide a rationale for window dressing where investors respond to conflicting signals of managerial ability inferred from a fund's performance and its disclosed portfolio holdings. We contend that window dressers take a risky bet on their performance during a reporting delay period, which...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009784848
We provide a rationale for window dressing where investors respond to conflicting signals of managerial ability inferred from a fund's performance and disclosed portfolio holdings. We contend that window dressers take a risky bet on their performance during a reporting delay period, which...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010363240
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010530183