This paper develops a new framework for the design of collateral requirements in a centrally cleared market. Clearing members post collateral - initial margins and default funds - to increase their pledgeable income, thereby credibly committing to risk management. We show that initial margins...

Counterparty default risk might hamper trade and trigger a financial crisis. The introduction of a central clearing counterparty (CCP) benefits trading but pushes systemic risk into CCP default. Standard risk management strategies at CCPs currently overlook a risk associated with crowded trades....

Central to the ongoing debate on default resource adequacy are the incentives provided by the clearinghouse waterfall structure. We show that clearinghouse equity and member default funds play a complementary role to initial margins: they incentivize safe members to participate rather than...

If all intermediaries enter the same market-making “bet” on the same side, fast-moving capital gets tied up in a crowded trade. This creates systemic risk for a central clearing party (CCP) since multiple traders might default when the bet turns extremely sour. The CCP then has to unwind the...

Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) have a variety of economic rationales. The Great Recession of 2007-2009 led regulators to mandate CCPs for most interest-rate and credit derivatives, markets in which large amounts of risks are transferred across agents. This change led to a large increase...

We investigate the effects of introducing a central clearing counterparty (CCP) on securities prices by adopting as an experimental construct the 2009 CCP reform in three Nordic markets. We find that, relative to other European economies, these countries experience market-adjusted equity returns...