Bank supervisors utilize early warning signals to predict which banks are likely to become distressed. Previous research has found that market discipline signals do not significantly improve out-of-sample forecasts relative to accounting-based signals. Most of that evidence, however, comes from...

Opacity fosters price contagion that exacerbates the speculative cycles of bubbles and crashes that create financial instability. We find that banks with larger investments in opaque assets benefitted more from intra-industry revaluations associated with announcements of mergers in the period...

Analyzing syndicated loan and public debt originations by publicly traded U.S. firms between 2004 and 2011, we document a sharp migration from bank borrowing to either no borrowing or public debt issuance in the crisis years. We find evidence for a bank-lending channel; the migration from bank...

We examine the effects of opacity on bank valuation and the synchronicity of bank equity prices over the years 2000-2006 prior to the 2007 financial crisis. Investments in opaque assets are more profitable than transparent assets, and controlling for profitability, have larger valuation...