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During the 1930s, rating agencies took up a central role in regulatory supervision that they still have today. The proximate cause for this changeover was the economic shock of the Great Depression. Exploring the performance of rating agencies in assessing the risks of sovereign debt, an...
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This chapter argues that, since the 1980s, moral hazard has encouraged excessive indebtedness and contributed to greater leniency from regulators and financial gatekeepers towards systemic banks. Examining the rise of the “too big to fail” (TBTF) banking behemoths, we question how moral...
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We discuss the implications of our analysis. Persistent regulatory issues continue after the 2008 crash, threaten the stability of financial flows and the world economy, and undermine our democratic societies. The global nature of these issues requires serious efforts to harmonise regulation,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012101266
During the 1930s, rating agencies took up a central role in regulatory supervision that they still have today. The proximate cause for this changeover was the economic shock of the Great Depression. Exploring the performance of rating agencies in assessing the risks of sovereign debt, an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013131572