We extend the literature on local income tax competition by allowing for inter-jurisdictional spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption of a publicly provided good. Comparing decentralized second-best results of a theoretical model with an efficient benchmark, we identify three...

This paper shows how a popular system of federal revenue equalization grants can limit tax competition among subnational governments, correct fiscal externalities, and increase government spending. Remarkably, an equalization grant can implement efficient policy choices by regional governments,...

In this paper, commuting is introduced to a federal economy where benevolent lower-level (state) governments levy an ad valorem tax on labour income. This results in inefficiently low levels of taxation, even when households as a whole do not migrate. Indeed, rather than attracting more workers...

This paper challenges the view that tax base equalization by the so-called Representative Tax System (RTS) removes inefficient undertaxation in corporate tax competition. The innovation of the paper is that it focuses on a tax on corporate income, instead of the unit tax on capital considered in...

This paper analyzes the efficiency consequences of local revenue policies if jurisdictions try to attenuate the pressures of inter-regional competition for mobile factors by substituting attention-grabbing tax instruments that spotlight an additional tax burden with rather inconspicuous ones. We...

Tax competition is supposed to lead to inefficiencies in the provision of public goods and difficulties for decentralized redistribution. A necessary condition for these ef fects to occur is that residence and location decisions are determined by fiscal considerations. In this paper, the impact...

An increasing number of municipalities cooperates in the field of economic development. In this paper, we focus on a specific instrument in this field, namely the development of joint business parks. We apply a hazard model to data from West-German municipalities between 2000 and 2015. We find...

We analyze the strategic interaction of regional and federal governments using a model that includes fiscal externalities in the form of inter-regional capital tax competition and technical externalities in the form of inter-regional spillovers. The federal government aims to correct for these...

In assessing the desirability for tax decentralization reforms, a dilemma between efficiency and redistribution emerges. By limiting the ability of the central government to redistribute resources towards regions in financial needs, decentralization curbs incentives for excessive subnational...