We analyse optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New-Keynesian model with public debt and inflation persistence. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) have shown that optimal discretionary policy is subject to a ''debt stabilization bias'' which requires debt to be returned to its pre-shock level. This...

We model a monetary union where fiscal discretion generates excessive debt accumulation in steady state and inefficiently delayed debt adjustment following shocks. By setting a debt target and raising the political cost of deviating from the optimal pace of debt reversal¸ institutional design...

This paper examines the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies using an estimated New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model for the US. In contrast to earlier work using VAR models, we show that the strategic complementary or substitutability of fiscal and monetary policy depends...

There have been widespread criticisms of EMU fiscal institutions. We consider a simple alternative to the deficit ceilings envisaged in the Stability and Growth Pact. We advocate the adoption of deficit targets. National governments should retain discretion in setting deviations from targets,...