This paper studies the regulation of an airline duopoly on a congested airport. Regulation should then address two market failures: uninternalized congestion, and overpricing due to market power. We find that first-best charges are differentiated over airlines if asymmetric, and completely drive...

This paper analyses the cost of access travel time variability for air travelers. Reliable access to airports is important since it is likely that the cost of missing a flight is high. First, the determinants of the preferred arrival times at airports are analyzed, including trip purpose, type...

This paper analyzes e fficient pricing at a congested airport dominated by a single firm. Unlike much of the previous literature, we combine a dynamic (bottleneck) model of congestion and a vertical structure model that explicitly considers the role of airlines and passengers. We show that when...

This paper investigates optimal airport pricing when airlines provide imperfect substitutes products, and make decisions on capacity, scheduling and pricing. We show that the first-best toll per flight may be higher than the simple market-shares formula that were recently derived for Cournot...