The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a...

We study which factors in terms of trading environment and trader characteristics determine individual information acquisition in experimental asset markets. Traders with larger endowments, existing inconclusive information, lower risk aversion, and less experience in financial markets tend to...

The ad hoc Black-Scholes (AHBS) model is one of the most widely used option valuation models among practitioners models. The main contribution of this study is methodological. We have two main results: (1) we make the empirical observation that typically the call and put sneers are discontinuous...

In this article, we provide an alternative evidence of asymmetric information in automobile insurance based on a copula model. We use the Frank’s copula to jointly model the type of policy coverage chosen and the number of accidents, with the dependence parameter providing for evidence of the...

We examine how analysts' anticipation of a management forecast affects their search for private information. Analysts are likely to acquire more private information because of the potential gains from trading on that information before a publicly disclosed management forecast. However, this...

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with...

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for all possible private information structures that the agents may have. Our characterization of these robust predictions relies on an epistemic result which establishes a relationship between the set...

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with...

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. The set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium for some information structure is equal to the...

In this paper the extended model of Minority game (MG), incorporating variable number of agents and therefore called Grand Canonical, is used for prediction. We proved that the best MG-based predictor is constituted by a tremendously degenerated system, when only one agent is involved. The...