This paper studies the coexistence of two competing mechanisms in the same market, where one follows the posted-offer rule and the other one incorporates a double-auction mechanism. We explore this coexistence within a sports betting example in which bettors are free to choose between a bookie...

We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions when the information held by strategic agents is a latent parameter. The analyst observes behavior which is rationalized by a Bayesian model in which agents maximize expected utility, given partial and differential information...

We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions when the information held by strategic agents is a latent parameter. The analyst observes behavior which is rationalized by a Bayesian model in which agents maximize expected utility given partial and differential information about...

We study which factors in terms of trading environment and trader characteristics determine individual information acquisition in experimental asset markets. Traders with larger endowments, existing inconclusive information, lower risk aversion, and less experience in financial markets tend to...

We examine how analysts' anticipation of a management forecast affects their search for private information. Analysts are likely to acquire more private information because of the potential gains from trading on that information before a publicly disclosed management forecast. However, this...

This study finds that pro-forma earnings forecasts by bidding firms during acquisitions are associated with a higher likelihood of deal completion, expedited deal closing, and with a lower acquisition premium − but only in stock-financed acquisitions. Analysts also respond to these forecasts...

We conduct laboratory experiments on variants of market scoring rule prediction markets, under different information distribution patterns, in order to evaluate the efficiency and speed of information aggregation, as well as test recent theoretical results on manipulative behavior by traders. We...

I develop a new asset pricing theory that bridges two seemingly unrelated pricing effects from separate literatures: (1) the negative relationship between ex-ante return skewness and expected returns and (2) the negative relationship between dispersion in financial analysts' earnings forecasts...

Motivated by the question of how one should evaluate professional election forecasters, we study a novel dynamic mechanism design problem without transfers. A principal who wishes to hire only high-quality forecasters is faced with an agent of unknown quality. The agent privately observes...

This paper documents the existence of Political Forecast Cycles. In a theoretical model of political selection, we show that governments release overly optimistic GDP growth forecasts ahead of elections to increase the reelection probability. The bias arises from lack of commitment if voters are...