We develop a dynamic agency model of a public corporation. Managers underinvest because of risk aversion. They smooth rents and payout. They do not exploit interest tax shields fully. The interactions of investment, debt and payout decisions can change drastically depending on managers'...

This paper explores the necessary conditions for outside equity financing when insiders, that is managers or entrepreneurs, are self-interested and cash flows are not verifiable. Two control mechanisms are contrasted: a partnership,' in which outside investors can commit assets for a specified...

This paper explores the necessary conditions for outside equity financing when insiders, that is managers or entrepreneurs, are self-interested and cash flows are not verifiable. Two control mechanisms are contrasted: a partnership,' in which outside investors can commit assets for a specified...

This review evaluates the four major theories of corporate financing: (1) the Modigliani–Miller theory of capital-structure irrelevance, in which firm values and real investment decisions are unaffected by financing; (2) the trade-off theory, in which firms balance the tax advantages of...