This paper examines the output and profit effects of horizontal mergers between upstream firms in intermediate goods markets. We consider market settings in which the upstream firms sell differentiated products to, and negotiate nonlinear supply contracts with, a downstream retail monopolist. If...

We extend the theory of bilateral vertical contracting to a double moral hazard setting where upstream and downstream firms make complementary investments that enhance demand, downstream firms make fixed investments to enter the downstream market, and contracts are private information and...

Antitrust practitioners are mis-applying simple vertical merger screening techniques (e.g., vertical foreclosure arithmetic, price pressure analysis) to reach flawed and internally inconsistent conclusions about vertical mergers. Specifically, practitioners have struck on a formula for claiming...

In January 2022, the Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission issued a Request for Information on Merger Enforcement, seeking comment on how the agencies can modernize enforcement of antitrust laws regarding mergers. A theme in the RFI is whether current guidance underemphasizes or...

We extend the theory of bilateral vertical contracting to a double moral hazard setting where upstream and downstream firms make complementary investments that enhance demand, downstream firms make fixed investments to enter the downstream market, and contracts are private information and...