We collect a sample of EU and US in-depth merger investigation, estimate models of the regulatory decisions and use the models to compare merger policies in the two jurisdictions. The approach used allows us to decompose observed differences between merger decisions into regime effects and...

Using a combination of public and internal information, this paper compares and contrasts EU and US merger policies. Common economics seems to lead both authorities to consider remarkably comparable portfolios of mergers once the nominal differences in the regimes (US reviews more cases) are...

Most mergers involve multiple markets. The potential for settlement can vary by the fraction of the overall deal attributable to the markets of concern. (i.e., by the “overlap”). If an antitrust agency challenges a merger having only a small overlap, negotiating a settlement is very likely;...

Using a combination of public and internal information, this paper compares and contrasts European Union (EU) and United States (US) merger policies. Common economic analysis leads both authorities to subject remarkably comparable portfolios of mergers to close scrutiny. Vertical mergers account...

In this study, merger enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission is shown to be affected by structural variables (the Herfindahl, the change in the Herfindahl, and the number of significant rivals), an entry index, and three evidence variables (hot documents, validated customer complaints, and...

More than ten years after the European merger policy reform, sufficient data has been accumulated to explore the impact of the reform on the difference between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) merger policy. We expect policies to converge following the EU 2004 reform that...