Similar Search Results

Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games.

Binmore, K.; Piccione, M.; Samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1996

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443407

Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection.

Binmore, K.; Samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1997

This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443438

Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games.

Binmore, K.; Piccione, M.; Samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1996

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443493

Muddling Through : Noisy Equilibrium Section.

Binmore, K.; samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443505

Strategy-Proofness in Many-To-One Matching Problems.

Sonmez, T. - Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646597

Evolution of Bihavior in Family Games.

Bergstrom, T. - Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646600

When is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction Under Free Access Correct? -- A Game - Theoretic Justification for Non Game-Theoretic Analyses.

Brooks, R.; Controneo, J.; Murray, M.; Salant, S. - Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005671895