An experiment with the hawk-dove game showed that if players observe solely an arbitrary and trivial characteristic of their opponent (e.g. a colour label assigned randomly to each player at the outset), a pattern of discrimination may evolve (i.e. those possessing one of the two colours will...

The neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the...

A general procedure inspired by the Shapley value is proposed for decompodsing any inequality index by factor components or by populations subgroups. To do so we define two types of inequality games. Although these games cannot be expressed in terms of unanimity games, an axiomatization of the...

The Serial Cost Sharing Rule has been conceived originally for problems where agents ask for different quantities of an homogeneous private good, the sum of which is produced by a single facility. In this context, it is endowed with a variety of desirable equity and coherency properties. This...

The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It...

A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A Queue has been organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs...

We propose a simple model of competition for the production of energy between a thermal station and an hydrostation. We show analytically and geometrically that, despite its static characteristics, the output from the thermal station is determined by the intertemporal specifications of costs and...

In this paper we will describe a class of three-person games and draw general conclusions about non-cooperative behavior in them.

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.

The aim of this paper is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game...