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In congestion games, players use facilities from a common pool. The benefit that a player derives from using a facility depends, possibly among other things, on the number of users of this facility. The paper gives an easy alternative proof of the isomorphism between exact potential games and...
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Neighbour games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain. As a consequence, the class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component...
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The class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (cf. Curiel et al. (1994)). For assignment games and component additive games there exist polynomially bounded algorithms or order p4 for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775427
In this paper we analyse the set of scalar algebraic Riccati equations (ARE) that play an important role in finding feedback Nash equilibria of the scalar N-player linear-quadratic differential game. We show that in general there exist maximal 2N-1 solutions of the (ARE) that give rise to a Nash...
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The neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005660512
In this note we introduce weak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage model by assuming that the agents are no longer myopic in choosing a blocking pair. The new concept is based on threats within blocking pairs: an individually rational matching is weakly stable if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005660529
We introduce a spatial cost topology in the network formation model analyzed by Jackson and Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 71 (1996), 44-74. This cost topology might represent geographical, social, or individual differences. It describes variable costs of establishing social network...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775370