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Ghirardato, P.; Le Breton, M. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

This paper provides a characterization of the consequences of the assumption that a decision maker with a given utility function is Choquet rational: She maximizes expected utility, but possibly with respect to non-additive beliefs, so that her preferences are represented by Choquet expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478939

Muddling Through : Noisy Equilibrium Section.

Binmore, K.; samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443505

ОСНОВНЫЕ КОНЦЕПЦИИ РИСК-МЕНЕДЖМЕНТА

ВИКТОРОВИЧ, ХМЫРОВ ВЯЧЕСЛАВ - In: Бизнес в законе. … (2012) 3, pp. 245-249

В статье раскрываются основные этапы развития теории и практики риск-менеджмента. При этом особое внимание уделено осмыслению понятия «риск» в экономической...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011223861

A Theory of Political Compromise.

Dixit, A.; Grossmann, G.M.; Gul, F. - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International … - 1998

We study a political compromise founded on tacit cooperation. Two political parties must share a fixed pie in each of an infinite sequence of periode. In each pary the power has ultimate authority to devide the pie.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005663971

On Mutual Insurance.

Ermoliev, Y.M.; Flam. S.D. - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2000

: first, to design mutual contracts for risk averse agents; second, to quantify the malfunctioning of such contracts when … there are risk lovers (or scale economies); and third, to estimate reasonable premiums for insurance offered by outside …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647149

On the Evolution of Attitudes Towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games.

Dekel, E.; Scotchmer, S. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1999

A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and … the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the … same argument suggests that males will evolve to be risk-takers. Psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783642

E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox.

Eichberger, J.; Kelsey, D. - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 1996

This paper introduces E-capacities as a representation of beliefs which incorporates objective information about the probability of events. It can be shown that the Choquet integral of an E-capacity is the Ellsberg representation. The paper further explores properties of this representation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357547

Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination - Experimental Evidence.

Charness, G.; Grosskopf, B. - 2001

Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental games each player was informed about both his payoff and the action of the other player in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245570

Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games.

Blume, A. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1996

This paper studies the evolution of effective pre-play communication in game where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566227