An analysis of the disease of formalism in modern economics. Its manifestation in general equilibrium theory, game theory, the new classical macroeconomics and real business cycle theory. Symptoms of the disease in the current vogue for postmodernism in methodololy. The possibilities for curing...

We explore the effects of social distance on reciprocal behavior in an experiment conducted over the Internet on three continents and in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain.

Since some Nash equilibria can be considered as irrational, we are interested here in refinements of Nash equilibria, i.e. concepts of solutions associating to each game a subset of Nash equilibria of this game. Considering only finite games with normal form, we first define the most desirable...

In this paper we model the dynamic interaction of two types of agents, experimenters and imitators, whose behavior is characterized by simple rules of thumb. The agents repeatedly play a one-shot game in which the agent's actions are strategic substitutes.

Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1995), we define several conditions of natural mechanisms in production economies, and proposed two types of natural mechanisms, that is, the quantity and price-quantity types.

Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1995), we define several conditions of natural mechanisms in production economies, and proposed two types of natural mechanisms, that is, the quantity and price-quantity types.

This is Part II of a study of the axiomatic and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation. Part I is a user's guide. Part II discusses alternatives to the axiomatic method and answers criticisms often addressed at the axiomatic method.

In this paper we analyze the connection between Nash bargaining and non-cooperative bargaining, the so-called Nash program, to solve the question of whether outside options should be considered as a the disagreement point.

This paper extends the infinitely repeated tariff lobbying game of Pecorino [8] to allow for imperfect monitoring, and revisits the question of how an industry's ability to maintain a cooperative outcome is affected by the number of firms in the industry. The paper demonstrated that Pecorino [8]...

Calling upon both positive and normative economics, the authors attempt to characterize the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change.