This paper makes two points. First, the modeling used in the rational (or Bayesian) learning literature can be generalized to handle the repeated shocks to preferences inherent and implicit in models of quantal response equilibria (QRE). In particular, we note that the Bayesian model and the QRE...

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionary literature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simple behavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.

This paper examines equilibrioum and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2x2 coordination games.

In this article, we study the emergence of coordination in repeated Sender-Receiver games with common interests when the messages have no common meaning before the game starts. We define axiomatic interpretation rules of the histories and study the resulting language-free signaling equilibria...

We study the tendering decisions of shareholders endowed with multiple shares to test game-theoretic models of the tendering process in the laboratory. An equilibrium outcome in which value-increasing takeovers always just succeed fails to emerge. Rather, tendered shares cycle around the...

This paper provides a methodology to study coalition formation problems with externalities and heterogeneous players, whensome subset of the players can act as "coalition developers" over time. The framework provided here allows to explicitly predict the timing of admission to coalitions, the...

We present the model of games with incomplete information first introduced by Harsanyi and show the link with extensive form games with imperfect information. We provide then a construction of the universal type space of Mertens and Zamir together with some properties.

Since some Nash equilibria can be considered as irrational, we are interested here in refinements of Nash equilibria, i.e. concepts of solutions associating to each game a subset of Nash equilibria of this game. Considering only finite games with normal form, we first define the most desirable...

Is selfishness always a bad thing, in the sense that people can only be better off when everyone is concerned with well-being of others as well as with his own, or are there situations in which altruis, can actually make things worse for all people involved? This paper tackles this question in...

This paper discusses and develops "non-welfaristic" arguments on distributive justice, mainly basing upon J. Rawls and A.K. Sen, and formalizes, in cooperative production economies, "non-welfaristic" distribution rules as game forms. First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle that the distribution...