This paper examines an Outside Option Game Designed to study the tension between maximizing the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of thus surplus among those who contributed to its creation.

We show that a strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.

If a solution (on a closed family of games) satisfies dummy axiom (DUM) and independance of irrelevant strategies (IIS) then it also satisfies consistency (CONS) (proposition 2.21, Peleg and Tijs, 1996). The converse of this proposition is not true: CONS implies neither DUM nor IIS as shown in...

In this paper we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...

Tax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.

We introduce a procedure that uses basic typological charasteristics of equilibrium correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts, to define broad equivalence classes of finite generic games in normal form. The proposed procedure is viewed as a potentially useful way of both organizing the...