We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...

We use the framework of random matching games and develop a two society model to analyze the interaction of societies with different social norms. Each agent repeatedly faces two different coordination games. A social norm of a society is a mode of behavior - strategy - which is adopted by a...

This paper looks at implementation in economic environments when agents have perfect information about the state of the world, but cannot commit not to renegotiate bad outcomes or to collude against each other. If renegotiation satisfies a weak condition of disagreement point monotonicity, then...

In general in an organization whose system of governance involves weighted voting, a member's weight in terms of the number of votes and the formal power it represents differ. Power indices provide a means of analyzing this difference. The paper uses new algorithms for computing power indices...

We use the framework of random matching games and develop a two society model to analyze the interaction of societies with different social norms. Each agent repeatedly faces two different coordination games. A social norm of a society is a mode of behavior - strategy - which is adopted by a...

This paper looks at implementation in economic environments when agents have perfect information about the state of the world, but cannot commit not to renegotiate bad outcomes or to collude against each other. If renegotiation satisfies a weak condition of disagreement point monotonicity, then...