We show that a strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.

If an inspector is work averse and his effort spent on investigating reports is not observable this creates a moral hazard problem whenever there is an imperfect monitoring technology. This problem arises because the organization can not distinguish between an inspection that doesn't find...

Tax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.

In perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and a formulation with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over in a particular...

Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1997), we define two types of natural mechanisms quantity and price-quantity types, in convex production economies, and characterize the class of Pareto subsolutions doubly implementable in Nash and strong Nash equilibria...

We study endogenous coalition formation in contexts where individual (and group) payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure that might form. We capture potential interaction across coalitions by means of a partition function.

We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.