Purely non-cooperative principles, as itereted dominance and backward induction, explain divided government.

In this paper we show that in a simple spacital model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if The outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficients equal to their share of seats, only a two-party voting equilibrium basically exists. The...

There is a widespread concern that a greater mobility of individuals can undermine any attempt to redistribute income at the local level. In this paper we derive the equilibrium level of redistribution when both the rich and the poor are mobile (although in different degrees) and when each...

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.

Адекватное взаимодействие государства и экономики ключевая проблема современных стран. Каким образом улучшить функционирование государства в условиях...