The supply of local public goods would obey principles that are not fundamentally different from those governing the efficient supply of differentiated goods. All these results rest on the assumption of an efficient land market. This suggests that the problem of land property rights should...

The supply of local public goods would obey principles that are not fundamentally different from those governing the efficient supply of differentiated goods. All these results rest on the assumption of an efficient land market. This suggests that the problem of land property rights should...

The lobbying process is modelled as an auction with externalities in which lobbies bid to get implemented thei most-prefered policy. Further more, the government may influence the lobbying process itself by biasing the auction among organized interests. We identify the following trade-off :...

In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption. There appears to be two main reasons behind the behavior of local governments in Russia. First,...

We find strong evidence in the OECD country panel to support the Knightian view that non-diversifiable economic risks shape the equilibrium entrepreneurship in an occupational choice model. Differential social insurance of entrepreneurial and labor risk is found to be statistically significant...

A common view in public finance is that there is an efficiency-redistribution tradeoff in which distortions are tolerated in order to redistribute income. However, the fact thatso much public- and private redistributive activity involves in-kind transfers rather than cash may be indicative of...

This paper presents a simple model of the links between education, democratization and economic developmnet. In a context of imperfect capital markets, we investigate the incentives for a capitalist oligarchy to subsidize the education of poor workers and to initiate a political transition.

This paper presents a structural model of optimal fiscal policy in a multiparty system which allows the existence of coalition governments. The paper shows how political effects weaken stabilizing feedback rules from inherited public debt to the current poicy instruments of government...

The paper employs a standard model of dynamic price competition to study how international principles of value-added taxation affect the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other's home market. If costs of production are...

This paper examines the impact of political competition on block grants from federal to subfederal levels of government. We model the extent and direction of income redistribution as determined proximately by the political agendas of central decisionmakers and, at a deeper level, by the...