Biographical note: GintisHerbert: Herbert Gintis holds faculty positions at the Santa Fe Institute and Central European University. He is the author of "Game Theory Evolving" (Princeton), coauthor of "A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution" with Samuel Bowles (Princeton), and...

Human groups maintain a high level of sociality despite a low level of relatedness among group members. The behavioral basis of this sociality remains in doubt. This paper reviews the evidence for an empirically identifiable form of prosocial behavior in humans, which we call "strong...

A number of outstanding puzzles in economics may be resolved by recognizing that where members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a social norm, agents may obey the norm and punish its violators, even when this behavior cannot be motivated by self-regarding, outcome-oriented...

Economists warn that policies to level the economic playing field come with a hefty price tag. But this so-called 'equality-efficiency trade-off' - has proven difficult to document. The data suggest, instead, that the extraordinary levels of economic inequality now experienced in many economies...

Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information...