We conduct a novel experimental test of the Coase conjecture using subjects' private information about preferences for fairness. In an infinite horizon bargaining game, a proposer proposes a division of chips, until a responder accepts. Given private information about fairness preferences and...

I study the evolutionary stability of 'mildly responsive' behavioural rules in a bargaining game. Individuals in a population (that may be finite or be described by individuals distributed uniformly over a continuum of fixed mass) bargain with all other individuals in a pair-wise manner over a...

Do contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior? We address this question in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on...

Experiments show that in sequential bargaining games (SBG), subjects usually deviate from game-theoretic predictions. Previous explanations have focused on considerations of fairness in the offers, and social utility functions have been formulated to model the data. However, a recent explanation...

We study strategic interaction in an experimental social-preferences vacuum chamber. We mute social preferences by letting participants knowingly interact with computers. Our new design allows for indirect strategic interaction: there are several waves in which computer players inherit the...

Subgame perfect equilibrium predictions of ultimatum bargaining games correspond poorly to the data gathered from human subjects in laboratory environments. Attempts to reconcile this discrepancy have taken one or more of three routes: (1) expanding the agent foresight and scope of decisions,...

Subgame perfect equilibrium predictions of ultimatum bargaining games correspond poorly to the data gathered from human subjects in laboratory environments. Attempts to reconcile this discrepancy have taken one or more of three routes: (1) expanding the agent foresight and scope of decisions,...

I consider two new simple bargaining games in which two players bargain over division of a fixed amount of money. Both games are strategically equivalent to the dictator game, in that one player has the unilateral ability to determine the allocation. However, that player can instead choose to...

We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and two groups of three recipients each. She cannot discriminate within, but across groups. A committee with representatives...

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial...