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Efficiency and collusion neutrality of solutions for cooperative TU-games
Brink, René van den - 2009
use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378796
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Efficient formulas and computational efficiency for glove games
Belau-Garmann, Julia - 2013
A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield different distributions of worth. Moreover, computational effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211890
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From hierarchies to levels : new solutions for games
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Brink, René van den; Laan, … - 2015
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players ́possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532576
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Supply chain reliability and the role of individual suppliers
Hagspiel, Simeon - 2016
properties of the problem. A number of desirable properties is thus achieved, including static efficiency as well as efficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457022
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Pipeline power : a case study of strategic network investments ; conference paper
Hubert, Franz; Cobanli, Onur - 2014 - This version: January 2014
We use the Shapley value and the nucleolus to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two pipelines, `Nord Stream' and `South Stream', allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. The third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490647
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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021
In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012550309
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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021
In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012494898
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Fairness and squareness: fair decision making rules in the EU council?
Turnovec, František (contributor) - 2009
The concept of fair representation of voters in a committee representing different voters' groups, such as national representations in union of states, is discussed. This concept, introduced into discussion about voting rights in the Council of European Union in 2004, was narrowed to proposal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003790289
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A cooperative value for Bayesian games
Kalai, Adam Taumann; Kalai, Ehud - 2010
Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665710
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Az ellenzék ereje : általános súlyozott szavazási játékok
Kóczy, László Á.; Pintér, Péter Miklós - 2010
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008668694