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Efficiency and collusion neutrality of solutions for cooperative TU-games
Brink, René van den - 2009
use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378796
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Efficient formulas and computational efficiency for glove games
Belau-Garmann, Julia - 2013
A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield different distributions of worth. Moreover, computational effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211890
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From hierarchies to levels : new solutions for games
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Brink, René van den; Laan, … - 2015
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players ́possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532576
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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021
In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012494898
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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021
In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012550309
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Pipeline power : a case study of strategic network investments ; conference paper
Hubert, Franz; Cobanli, Onur - 2014 - This version: January 2014
We use the Shapley value and the nucleolus to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two pipelines, `Nord Stream' and `South Stream', allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. The third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490647
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Supply chain reliability and the role of individual suppliers
Hagspiel, Simeon - 2016
properties of the problem. A number of desirable properties is thus achieved, including static efficiency as well as efficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457022
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Distributing dividends in games with ordered players
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasilʹev, … - 2006
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors to every TU-game. Some solutions that are based on distributing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350374
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The restricted core for totally positive games with ordered players
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasilʹev, … - 2009
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378242
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The alpha-constant-sum games
Wang, Wenna; Brink, René van den; Sun, Hao; Xu, Genjiu; … - 2019
Given any α ∈ [0, 1], an α-constant-sum game on a finite set of players, N, is a function that assigns a real number to any coalition S ⊆ N, such that the sum of the worth of the coalition S and the worth of its complementary coalition N\S is α times of the worth of the grand coalition....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011987594