This paper advances the idea that, in a variety of environments, it is natural to think of the solution of a (coalition form) game as an ordering of the players rather than as a division of the value of coalitions. Orderings that are characterized by an average of the desirability of one player...

Peer activities influence incentives in teams involving incomplete information through the information they transmit. One channel of information transmission is through costless signaling - team bonding, motivational sessions etc. - which in the language of game theory is cheap talk. Another is...

The author studies the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of social learning. For a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued characteristic function, he first shows that all self-perpetuating allocations realized from a simple bargaining game...

This paper suggests a theory of choice among strategic situations when the rules of play are not properly specified. We take the view that a quot;strategic situationquot; is adequately described by a TU game since it specifies what is feasible for each coalition but is silent on the procedures...

This note shows that the most informative equilibrium in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) game of strategic information transmission is almost fully revealing as the two players' preferences get closer to each other. It thus strengthens the original observation that the quality of information does...