This paper investigates the impact of individual characteristics on behavior in strategic-form. We first measure subjects' logical abilities and social preferences and then evaluate their influence on behavior in strategic-form games. For this purpose, we estimate how logical abilities and...

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is...

This paper studies full implementation problems in (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium in finite environments. We restrict the designer to adopt<I>finite</I> mechanisms, thus ruling out integer games. We provide a condition, top-<I>D</I> inclusiveness, that together with set-monotonicity is sufficient for mixed...</i></i>

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.