Our research investigates whether social preferences are stable across contexts in the field. We build a unique data set by recruiting participants from a low-income urban neighborhood to participate in a series of laboratory experiments. Their decisions are used to demonstrate the stability of...

There is a large body of evidence showing that a substantial proportion of people contribute positive amounts in public goods games, even if the situation is one-shot and completely anonymous. Clearly, this is in conflict with the prediction of neoclassic economic theory. One of the most...

The opportunity to tell a white lie (i.e., a lie that benefits another person) generates a moral conflict between two opposite moral dictates, one pushing towards telling always the truth and the other pushing towards helping others. Here we study how people resolve this moral conflict. What...

This paper studies the impact of inequity aversion preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) in a "repeated" public goods game. We assume that agents care about the expected payoff differences among themselves over all periods of a game, so that it is in fact a dynamic game that is being played. In...

We investigate experimentally the underlying motivations and individual differences with regard to the participation in between-group conflict in nested social dilemmas. In our nested social dilemmas, the collective is divided into two groups, and individuals allocate tokens between a private, a...

We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature of our model is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement between players about the “right”...

We experimentally study the impact of framing effects in a repeated sequential social dilemma game. Our between-subjects design consists of two group level ("Wall Street" vs. "Community") and two individual level ("First (Second) Movers" vs. "Leaders (Followers)") frames. We find that average...

We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement between players about the "right" payoff ordering....

In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two indicators to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval,...