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Zhao, Wei; Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012798454

Robust contracting under double moral hazard

Carroll, Gabriel; Bolte, Lukas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1623-1663

. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440091

Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2013

This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222351

A theory of threshold contracts

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013

We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102

Cooperative advertising contract design in a supply chain with an offline showroom under asymmetric information

Li, Mengli; Zhang, Xumei; Dan, Bin - In: Journal of the Operational Research Society 73 (2022) 2, pp. 261-272

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013170126

Asymmetric reimbursement and contingent fees in environmental conflicts : observable vs. unobservable contracts

Park, Sung-Hoon; Settle, Chad E. - In: Games 14 (2023) 4, pp. 1-9

specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i …) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts …; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426341

Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option

Choi, Jin Hyuk; Han, Kookyoung - In: International journal of game theory 52 (2023) 3, pp. 833-860

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014381852

Complete contracts under incomplete information

Curello, Gregorio; Lyu, Qianjun; Zhang, Yimeng - 2024

We study a moral hazard model in which the output is stochastically determined by both the agent's hidden effort and an uncertain state of the world. We investigate how the contractibility of the ex-post realization of the state affects the principal's incentive to provide information. While...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135462

Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions

Whitmeyer, Joseph M.; Whitmeyer, Mark - In: Journal of mathematical economics 94 (2021), pp. 1-5

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013282389

Coordinating a channel with asymmetric cost information and the manufacturer's optimality

Shen, Yuelin; Willems, Sean P. - In: International journal of production economics 135 (2011) 1, pp. 125-135

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009389110